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Abstract
What are the consequences of allowing private insurance as a supplement to social in-
surance? Is the scope of social insurance likely to be aﬀected by an introduction of an
optional supplemental private insurance?
The scope of social insurance is collectively decided and some may Þnd that this is
insuﬃcient. This may give rise to the demand that it should be possible to get additional
insurance in the private market. It is easy to conclude that as long as the private insurance
is optional, introducing such an option harms no one. However, preferences towards social
insurance are likely to be aﬀected by the introduction. This may aﬀect the scope of social
insurance through political channels and this may harm other group than those choosing
the private insurance.
An introduction of a private supplemental insurance may reduce the conßicts of in-
terests and may allow for more individual freedom. It may also improve eﬃciency in the
economy by reducing the public supply and thereby reducing the deadweight costs of tax-
ation. However, a reduction in the public supply may reduce redistribution and equality
in such an amount, that society is over all made worse oﬀ by the introduction of a private
supplemental supply.
I examine under which conditions allowing for additional private insurance may be
harmful for some groups. I Þnd that this depends on the wage distribution, the deadweight
costs of taxation and the conditions in the private insurance market.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Basic model 7
2.1 Introduction of a private insurance alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Heterogeneous risk 15
3.1 Introduction of a private alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 Heterogeneous income 21
4.1 Introduction of a private insurance alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.1 Only the high-income earners have a positive optimal demand . . . 33
4.1.2 Both the high- and median-income earners have a positive optimal
demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1.3 All three groups have a positive optimal demand. . . . . . . . . . . 41
5 Social mobility 42
5.1 Introduction of a private insurance alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6 Conclusion 53
1
1 Introduction
The welfare state has been heavily debated in recent years. Should we roll back the
spendings of the welfare state or not? Most of the focus has been on whether the welfare
state improves or erodes overall eﬃciency in the economy.
Growth and Employment: The Scope for a European Initiative by Drèze and Ma-
linvaud (1994) conclude that the agenda should be to make the Welfare State leaner
and more eﬃcient (p.82). Turning Sweden around (Lindbeck et al 1994) argues that
the welfare state has resulted in institutions and structures that today constitute an
obstacle to economic eﬃciency and economic growth because of their lack of ßexibility
and their one-sided concerns for income safety and distribution, with limited concern for
economic incentives (p. 17). Martin Feldstein was concerned with the adverse eﬀects of
social security spending on economic performance. He concluded that the social security
program [in the United States] approximately halves the personal savings rate, [which]
implies that is substantially reduces the stock of capital and the level of national income
(Feldstein 1974, p. 922)
These views are not the only ones however. Maddison (1984) stated that judgements
of the inßuence of the welfare state on economic development were inßuenced mainly by
ideological positions, or predictions about what might happen in the future. Sandmo
(1995) reviewed the aggregate empirical evidence between growth and social security and
concluded that there was no clear connection either way.
A powerful defense of the welfare state is presented by Atkinson (1999). He concludes
that  there can be little doubt about [the welfare states] importance in providing income
support. He Þnds no conclusive evidence between the aggregate relationships of economic
performance and the size of the welfare state.
Eﬃciency is just one aspect of the discussion of the welfare state. Another is legitimacy.
Rolling back the spendings of the welfare state may very well aﬀect the legitimacy of the
welfare state as well as the eﬃciency. In a democracy, the scope of the welfare state is not
decided by economists, but by the population through political channels. A welfare state
that is opposed by a large fraction of the population has a low degree of legitimacy and is
not sustainable over time. A change in the welfare state which aﬀects the majoritys view
of the welfare state, may thus have wider consequences than originally planned. When
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political support of the welfare state is aﬀected by the scope of the welfare state, there
may exist a conßict between eﬃciency and legitimacy.
The welfare state may be a redistributive tool, with the less fortunate being subsidized
by the more fortunate members of society. How eﬃcient the welfare state is as such a tool
is clearly dependent on its legitimacy.
Moene and Wallerstein (1999) investigate the eﬀect of changes in the inequality in
pre-tax and transfer income on the political support for welfare policy. In contrast to
the Þndings of Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), they
Þnd that The impact of increasing inequality on the political support for redistributed
policies depends critically on the way in which beneÞts are targeted when targeting is
exogenous. (p.26). They conclude that When beneÞts are mostly targeted to those
without earnings,......., greater inequality of income reduces support for redistributive
policies. and that Political support for beneÞts targeted to those without earnings goes
down as inequality increases..
Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (1998) present a model with majority voting to
examine the impact of the redistributive degree of the social insurance on the political
sustainability of the welfare state. They Þnd that there is a potential trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency costs and the political sustainability. They Þnd that it may be appropriate
to adopt a system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure
political support for an adequate level of coverage (p. 27). They also examine the eﬀect of
allowing supplemental private insurance. They Þnd that private insurance does undermine
the political support for social insurance, but that this nevertheless may increase the
welfare of the poor.
Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (1999) extend the model by allowing for two over-
lapping generations. They examine the eﬀects of changes in the population structure, Pay
As You Go-systems vs. Fully Funded-systems and take tax distortions into consideration.
Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (1998), (1999), Moene and Wallerstein (1999) and
(2001) all examine the need for a degree of universalistic welfare policies in contrast to
means-tested welfare policies. They all Þnd that a degree of universalistic welfare policies
may be needed for political support. M & W (2001) conclude that  a limited welfare
state that pays beneÞts only to the poor may be politically unsustainable in the absence of
altruistic voting. Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (1999) Þnd that universalistic policies
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are not desirable for the social planner. They Þnd however that universalistic policies may
be desirable when majority voting is taken into consideration due to the need for political
support.
I present a model of how political support for welfare policies depend on whether
there are private alternatives to the goods oﬀered by the welfare state. The welfare
policies here are insurance against income loss, with all welfare spendings being received
by those without other income. The question asked is: What is the optimal amount of
consumption of a private good, if this good is supplied by the government in an equal
amount for all, and is tax Þnanced? The trade-oﬀ is that the higher the tax, the higher
the consumption of this good, but this means lower consumption of other goods as well.
The answer is clearly dependent on preferences and income. In addition, it depends on
whether there are private alternatives to the publicly supplied good that may be less
expensive for some.
My focus is on the government as a collective supplier of a private good. I disregard
other aspect of the government. The policy space then becomes one-dimensional. The
only question is how large it should be, i.e. how high should the taxes be. Political
competition may drive the level of the public supply towards the ideal tax rate for the
median voter, i.e. the voter with the median ideal tax rate. If more than 50% of the
population prefers a lower, or higher, tax rate, political competition may drive the tax
rate up, or down. The higher the median ideal tax rate, i.e. the more people who prefer
a high tax rate, the higher the realized tax rate and supply of the good in question.
The good in question could be any private good. I have chosen insurance as an
example, but only minor changes are needed to capture the essence for other commodities,
e.g. health care, pensions or education. The Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function is a
quasi-concave utility function, strictly quasi-concave in the presence of risk aversion, while
the role of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is Þlled by the elasticity of substitution.
That the welfare state is a collective supplier implies that the scope of the welfare state,
i.e. the amount of goods supplied, is collectively decided through political channels. Given
that people are diﬀerent, some may be dissatisÞed with this amount. Some may Þnd it
too extensive, some may Þnd it insuﬃcient. I apply median voter theories for the analysis
of the support of the welfare state.
I assume that people vote strictly according to self-interests. It is possible to allow for
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some degree of altruism, as done in Moene and Wallerstein (1999).
The welfare state described here, is only a social insurance system, with the government
as a non-proÞt insurance agency. The scope of the welfare state (i.e. the tax rate) is
assumed to be decided through political competition. The decisive voter is the median
voter and the realized tax rate is the one that the median voter favors. The median
voter is not necessarily the median income earner. This is shown in section four. An
introduction of a private alternative may create a means-against-ends situation.
What are the eﬀects of allowing for an optional additional private insurance on the
scope of social insurance? I use social insurance as the term for the insurance supplied by
the government and private insurance as the term for insurance supplied by the private
insurance company. It is easy to conclude that private insurance can never hurt someone
as long as it is optional. This is not straightforward however. An introduction of a private
insurance may very well aﬀect the preferences towards the social insurance for some groups
of the population, and thereby aﬀect the scope of the social insurance as well. This may
imply a welfare loss for other groups.
There are several major diﬀerences between having the good supplied by the govern-
ment in the above mentioned manner or by a private Þrm:
 While the amount of goods is socially decided through a political process in the
public scheme, the amount is individually decided in the private scheme. The former
promotes equality, while the latter promotes individual choice.
 If the consumption of the publicly supplied good is equal for all, and thereby unre-
lated to the amount of tax paid, the public scheme works in a redistributive manner,
with consumption being more costly to the ones paying high taxes. In the private
scheme there are no such aspects, with everyone paying the same price.
 With a tax Þnanced public supply, there might be some deadweight costs, which
may increase with the supply. There are no deadweight costs associated with private
supply, but there may be rents, or proÞts, and other costs.
I do not consider informational aspects. Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) investigate
how public supply of a private good may weaken the information constraints of non-linear
taxation. I comment only very brießy on information aspects, even though there are many
insights to be found here.
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There may be reasons for wanting a mix of a public and a private supply. We may
want to limit the deadweight costs of taxation or allow for more individual freedom in the
consumption of the good in question. However, an introduction of a private supplement
to the social scheme may have eﬀects on the preferences of the population and through
this have eﬀects on the amount of the public supply. This may have undesired equality
and redistribution eﬀects.
The private supply may be more desirable for some parts of the population than for
other parts. If the amount of consumption is unrelated to tax payments in the collective
scheme, the higher-than-average taxpayers are subsidizing the lower-than-average tax-
payers in the public system. Thus it may be preferable for some parts of the population
to reduce the public part of the mix. If individuals are voting in accordance with their
self-interests, this may eﬀect the realized mix of the supply scheme.
If there are redistribution goals to the public supply, the social scheme is more favorable
to some. With no price discrimination, the price in the private marked is identical for all.
The private scheme is thus relatively favorable to some.
Additional private consumption for some only makes these individuals better oﬀ if the
amount of public consumption remains unchanged. However the private supplement may
aﬀect the preferences about the amount of public consumption and lead to a change in
the public sector through political processes. This may have consequences for the other
consumers in either a negative or positive manner. If the consequences are positive or
zero, the private supplement leads to a Pareto-improvement. Someone is made better
oﬀ without anyone being made worse oﬀ. If the consequences are negative, there is a
trade-oﬀ between individual and social welfare. The optimal mix of publicly and privately
consumption then depends on the social weights put on the losses and gains of the diﬀerent
individuals. The object here is to analyze under which conditions the private supplement
may lead to a loss for someone, and to highlight some factors that may inßuence a potential
loss.
In the next section I present the basic model, with a homogenous population and no
private alternative. Government spending is a tax-Þnanced transfer to the unemployed. I
then allow for a private supplemental insurance and analyze the eﬀects of this. In section
three I make the population heterogeneous in the way that the risk of being unemployed
is heterogeneous. Translated to another good, this would be that preferences over the
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various goods are heterogeneous. I again allow for a private insurance. In section four
I keep risk homogeneous, but introduce heterogeneous income and analyze the situation
with and without a private insurance. Section Þve adds social mobility to the situation of
heterogeneous income, with and without the private alternative. Section seven concludes.
2 Basic model
As a benchmark I start with a model with a homogenous population. It is homogenous
in three dimensions:
1. preferences
2. uncertainty
3. income
Homogeneous preferences are maintained throughout. Point 2 and 3 is relaxed later.
The individuals are facing a constant risk of losing their income (1 − p), where 0 >
p > 1. The probability p is assumed to be the same for all individuals. When losing
their income, they receive a tax-Þnanced support from the government, unrelated to prior
earnings. The support goes exclusively to those without other income. This simpliÞes
the analysis but is not crucial for the results. Moene and Wallerstein (1999) have a more
general model, where persons who are employed receive a share of the welfare spendings.
The post tax consumption of a person currently working is given by
CE = (1− t)w, (1)
where t is the marginal tax rate and w is the wage. The consumption of those without
earnings is given by total tax income T (t) divided by the share of the population without
earnings, (1− p).
CN =
T (t)
1− p (2)
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Total tax-income is given by
T (t) = τ(t)pw (3)
Here average income is pw. The function τ (t) represents tax-income as a function
of the tax rate, which implicitly incorporates the deadweight cost of taxation. Without
deadweight cost, we have τ(t) = t. With deadweight cost τ (t) is a strictly concave function
with τ(0) = τ(1) = 0 and τ 0(0) = 1. A concave function implies increasing deadweight
costs of taxation. All interesting values of t makes τ 0(t) > 0.
The preferences, which are assumed to be identical for all individuals, can be repre-
sented by a von-Neuman-Morgenstern utility function v(C)
v(C) = pu(CE) + (1− p)u(CN), (4)
where u0(C) > 0 and u00(C) ≤ 0 . Strict inequality in the latter implies risk aversion,
which is assumed throughout.
In the basic model everyone is identical and the preferred tax rate for one person is the
preferred tax rate for all. The preferred tax rate is the one that maximizes the expected
utility.
The preferred tax rate is given by the Þrst-order condition:
−pu0(CE)w + (1− p)u0(CN) p
1− pwτ
0(t∗) = 0,
which is equivalent with
MRSN,E ≡ 1− p
p
u0(CN)
u0(CE)
=
1− p
p
1
τ 0(t∗)
≡ Ps(t∗) (5)
The left-hand side of (5) is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
when employed and consumption when not employed. The right-hand side is the slope
of the transformation frontier between CE and CN , or the relative price on consumption
when unemployed in terms of consumption when employed. The price is increasing in t,
when τ 00(t) < 0. This means that the transfer costs are higher the higher the transfer. The
marginal relative value of consumption when not employed in terms of the marginal value
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of consumption when employed should equal the marginal relative price. The preferred
degree of insurance, CN/CE is a decreasing function of the price. The consumer wants to
transfer less consumption, the more costly this transfer is.
When there are no deadweight costs of taxation, τ 0(t) = 1 and Ps =
(1−p)
p
. The price
on social insurance is constant. The relative price on consumption when not employed is
equal to the relative weight on utility of consumption when not employed. If this is the
case, the optimal tax is the one that gives
u0(CN)
u0(CE)
= 1⇔
u0(CE) = u0(CN) (6)
When we have risk aversion (6) is equivalent to
CE = CN ⇔ (1− t)w = p
1− ptw⇔
t = 1− p⇔ CE = CN = pw
With risk aversion and no deadweight cost of taxation, the optimal tax rate is the
one that removes all uncertainty. The cost of risk has to be weighed against the cost of
taxation. Risk aversion means that the costs of risk are positive and that the individuals
prefer income smoothing. By raising the tax rate, we reduce the amount of risk, and
thereby the costs of risk. However, an increased tax rate may also increase the costs of
taxation. When τ (t) = t , the costs of taxation are constant (=0). There is no trade-oﬀ,
and the optimal solution will involve no risk. The social insurance system oﬀers insurance
at an actuarially fair premium under which any risk averse individual prefers complete
insurance with equal consumption regardless of income-loss or not. The system allows
the individuals to transfer income from income-earning state to a non-income state at a
relative price equal to the relative weights on these two states.
The optimal degree of insurance, and thereby the preferred tax rate, is an increasing
function of the degree of risk aversion and a decreasing function of the deadweight costs of
taxation. A higher degree of risk aversion implies that for a given tax rate, the marginal
relative beneÞt of more consumption when not employed (the left-hand side of (12))
increases. Higher deadweight costs of taxation implies that the marginal relative price on
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consumption when not employed (the right-hand side of (12)) increases. In the presence
of deadweight costs (τ 0(t) < 1) the optimal solution implies CE > CN with t < 1 − p.
The beneÞts of the insurance equal the costs at a lower degree of insurance, because the
costs will be a rising function of the tax rate. The optimal solution involves risk to the
individuals.
Even without deadweight costs the optimal solution may involve risk, even though
the individuals are risk averse. There is a potential moral hazard problem, not modeled
here. Faced with a complete insurance a person may not have any incentive to make an
eﬀort to try to keep his job. This may induce slacking and eﬃciency-loss and eventually
lead to an increase in p. An increase in p will be a welfare loss to the population. To
avoid this, the individuals have to be given work-incentives and thus be exposed to an
element of risk. A condition for an optimal solution may be that CE > CN , even without
a deadweight loss.
2.1 Introduction of a private insurance alternative
In what way is the solution aﬀected by allowing for a private additional insurance? Private
insurance can either be a supplement or an alternative to social insurance. I consider a
Topping up and not a Opting out regime, i.e. that choosing the private insurance
does not exclude the beneÞt of social insurance. If the tax rate is constant, the amount
of social insurance is given and private insurance is an optional supplement to social
insurance. However the introduction may very well aﬀect the individuals preferences
about the tax rate and may aﬀect the amount of social insurance through a political
process. If the amount of social insurance is aﬀected, private insurance is an alternative
to social insurance.
The insurance company oﬀers insurance-cover in an amount Q at a price q. Expected
proÞt for the insurance company is given by
E [Π] = qQ− (1− p)Q−K, (7)
where K is the Þxed costs.
If we assume that the insurance company is risk neutral, it will choose the price that
maximizes (7) given the consumers optimal choice of Q as a function of the price. We
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make the assumption of risk neutrality because an insurance company has many clients
and is able to pool the risks involved. This is a normal assumption in the insurance
literature.
The demander has an after-tax income IE = (1 − t)w if he is employed and IN =
p
1−pτ (t)w if he is unemployed. He may buy additional insurance in the private marked.
Consumption is given by
CE = IE − qQ = (1− t)w − qQ (8)
CN = IN − qQ+Q = p
1− pτ (t)w +Q(1− q) (9)
The consumer maximizes his expected utility given the tax rate, (8) and (9). The
Þrst-order condition is
MRSN,E ≡ 1− p
p
u0(CN )
u0(CE)
=
q
1− q ≡ Pp, (10)
if he demands additional insurance. Pp is the price in the private marked on consumption
when not employed in terms of consumption when employed. (10) deÞnes the demanded
amount of additional insurance as a function of the price, Q(q).
The consumer demands additional insurance only if his marginal beneÞt of additional
insurance, exceeds the costs:
MRS0N,E ≡
1− p
p
u0(IN)
u0(IE)
> Pp (11)
This is a suﬃcient and necessary condition for the demand to be positive, Q(q) > 0. If
(11) does not hold, there will be no demand, and no marked for additional insurance.
Since the preferred degree of insurance was increasing in the degree of risk aversion and
decreasing in the deadweight costs of taxation, a high degree of risk aversion and low
deadweight costs of taxation makes (11) more likely to hold.
For the insurance company to be economically viable, there has to be a q that makes
the demand for additional insurance positive and the expected proÞt non-negative. One
special case is that there are no Þxed costs. If (7) is to be non-negative, we have
qQ ≥ (1− p)Q⇔ q ≥ 1− p
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This is a necessary condition for a non-negative proÞt. If there are no Þxed costs, it is
also a suﬃcient condition. Any q < 1− p gives a negative expected proÞt, and makes the
insurance company economically non-viable.
A positive demand of private insurance may have consequences for the preferred tax
rate. If the costs of insurance are lower through the private insurance system than through
the social insurance system, it is beneÞcial to make private insurance a higher share of
the overall degree of insurance. Social insurance is preferred over private insurance only
as long the relative price is lower. The optimal composition of insurance is the one that
minimizes the costs of insurance. Social insurance is preferred up to the point where
private insurance oﬀers insurance at a lower cost. This optimal level of social insurance
is implicitly given by the cost-eﬃcient tax rate, t. The cost-eﬃcient tax rate is the tax
rate that equals the relative price on social and private insurance and is deÞned by
Ps(t) = Pp
1− p
p
1
τ 0(t)
=
q
1− q
τ 0(t) =
1− q
q
1− p
p
(12)
When the deadweight costs of taxation are increasing, i.e. τ 00 < 0, Ps(t∗) is an increasing
function of the tax rate. Social insurance is preferred as long as this insurance form is less
costly than private insurance. By raising the tax rate, the degree of insurance rises but
so does the price. If you want the degree of insurance to be higher, but this makes the
price on social insurance higher than the price on private insurance, it is better to choose
private than social insurance. Recall that q ≥ 1− p and that we assume τ 0(0) = 1. Thus
the right hand side of (12) is greater or equal to one. It is equal to one if q = 1−p. If this
is the case, t = 0. The social insurance is more expensive than the private for all values
of t. For all q > 1−p, there exists a level of insurance that makes private insurance more
expensive than social insurance. Hence t > 0.
If the deadweight costs of taxation are constant, both the relative price on social and
private insurance are constant. Private insurance is either overall preferred over social
12
insurance or not preferred at all. Private insurance is strictly preferred as long as
τ 0 <
1− p
p
1− q
q
If the deadweight costs are large enough, compared to the price on private insurance,
private insurance is less costly than social insurance and is strictly preferred. The cost-
eﬃcient tax rate is in this case zero. If the deadweight costs are not large enough, there
exists no economically viable private insurance marked.
Consumption when not employed at the tax rate t is given by
CN ≡ p
1− pτ (t)w (13)
CN is the highest amount of consumption when not employed where social insurance is
preferred over private insurance. This consumption is increasing in t. Any CN higher
than CN is less costly in the private marked than through the social insurance system for
group i. If t = 0⇔ CN = 0. The optimal budget constraint is thus given by
CE = w − Ps(t)CN for 0 ≤ CN ≤ CN (14)
CE = w − PpCN for CN > CN (15)
The optimal degree of insurance is given by
MRSN,E = Pp (16)
, if at optimum, there is a demand for private insurance, Q∗ > 0, and C∗N > CN . If this
is the case the preferred tax rate is that which equals the costs, t∗ = t. If there is no
demand for private insurance at optimum, Q∗ = 0 and C∗N ≤ CN , the optimal degree of
insurance is given by
MRSN,E = Ps(t
∗) ≤ Pp (17)
Proposition 1 If a private insurance alternative is introduced in an economy with a
homogeneous population, and this private insurance is economically viable, the result is a
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reduction in the preferred tax rate and the preferred degree of social insurance
If the realized tax rate is the preferred tax rate without private insurance, then the
marginal rate of substitution between the two income states equals the relative price on
social insurance
MRS0N,E =
1− p
p
u0(IN )
u0(IE)
= Ps(t
∗), (18)
where Ps(t) is deÞned in (5). The private insurance alternative has to oﬀer insurance at
a lower marginal cost than the social insurance does. Pp < Ps(t∗) is then a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for Q(q) > 0.
Pp =
q
1− q <
1− p
p
1
τ 0(t∗)
= Ps(t
∗) (19)
This is equivalent to
τ 0(t∗) <
1− p
p
1− q
q
, (20)
With no deadweight costs of taxation τ 0(t) = 1. Recall that for the insurance company
to be economically viable, demand has to make the proÞts non-negative, i.e. q ≥ 1 − p
is a necessary condition for a positive supply of private insurance. Hence the right-hand
side of (20) cannot be less than one. This means that deadweight costs of taxation is a
necessary condition for a positive demand of private insurance and that these deadweight
costs has to make social insurance more costly than private insurance. The introduction
of an economically viable private insurance to an economy that has constant deadweight
costs of taxation, means that the preferred tax rate is reduced to zero.
In the case of increasing deadweight costs of taxation, the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a viable insurance marked, eq (20), implies the condition that the tax rate
has to be higher than the cost-eﬃcient tax rate, t∗ > t. This means that it is possible to
buy insurance at a lower cost if the tax rate is lower. If the private insurance company
oﬀers insurance at a lower marginal cost than the social insurance does, it is beneÞcial
to lower the amount of social insurance and acquire additional private insurance. If the
marginal costs of private insurance are higher than of the social insurance, the private
insurance are not economically viable.
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We see from this that if the private insurance is attractive to the population, it is
because private insurance oﬀers insurance at a lower cost than social insurance. A welfare
gain is then possible if we reduce the level of social insurance by reducing the tax rate. In
the case of constant deadweight costs of taxation the optimal level of social insurance is
zero. In the case of increasing deadweight costs, the optimal level is the one that equals
the costs of the two insurance forms, deÞned by the tax rate t.
Private insurance is viable only as long as it can oﬀer insurance at a lower cost than
the social insurance system. An introduction of a private insurance alternative thus lowers
the preferred tax rate in the case of a homogenous population. By introducing a private
insurance alternative, we are able two minimize the costs associated with insurance. Social
insurance is used for levels that makes the costs of insurance lower than through the private
insurance.
3 Heterogeneous risk
I now expand the model to a model where the population is divided into three groups, H,
M and L. This introduces aspects of conßict of interests. The groups are diﬀerent with
respect to the risk of income-loss. The share σi of the population has a probability pi of
keeping their job, with 0 < pi < 1, i = H,M,L and pH > pM > pL. I assume σH < 12 and
σL <
1
2
, which means that the median risk-holder is in the middle group.
Total tax-income is now
T (t) = (pHσH + pMσM + pLσL) τ (t)w = p¯τ(t)w (21)
p¯ is the average probability of a person keeping the job, which I assume is identical to the
probability in the basic model.
A member of group i has an utility-function:
vi(C) = piu(CE) + (1− pi)u(CN), (22)
with the same properties as above.
This member has a preferred tax rate that maximizes his utility. The Þrst-order
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condition is:
−piu0(CE)w + (1− pi)u0(CN) p¯
1− p¯wτ
0(t) = 0
MRSiN,E ≡
1− pi
pi
u0(CN)
u0(CE)
=
1− p¯
p¯
1
τ 0(t∗i )
≡ Ps (23)
The price is identical to the previous section, but the preferences vary. More speciÞ-
cally, the weights put on utility of consumption whether one is employed or not employed,
vary. The weight put on utility of consumption when not employed is greater, the greater
the probability of losing the job. We see from the Þrst-order condition that if pi = p¯ , i.e.
the probability of keeping the job for group i equals the average probability, the preferred
tax rate is identical to the solution with homogenous risk, e.g. (5). The lowest probability
has to be lower than the average probability, pL < p¯, and the highest probability has to
be greater than average, pH > p¯. Hence, the L-group faces a relative price higher, and
the H-group a relative price lower, than their respective relative weight on consumption.
The preferred tax rate for the H-group is thus lower than in the previous section with
homogenous risk and the preferred tax rate for L-group is higher. The median preferred
tax rate is t∗M . The median voter is thus in theM -group and the realized tax rate is t
∗
M . If
pM = p¯ the realized tax rate will be identical to the previous section. Without deadweight
costs of taxation (τ 0(t) = 1), the preferred tax rate is the one that gives CE = CN , which
is t = 1 − p¯. Since pL < p¯, members of the L-group will prefer a higher tax rate and
over-insurance. A member of the H-group prefers a lower tax rate, since pH > p¯, and thus
incomplete insurance. The reason for this is that in a social insurance system the ones
facing a low risk are subsidizing the ones with a high risk. The presence of deadweight
costs will lower the preferred tax rate for all three groups. When τ 00 < 0, the reduction is
largest for the highest preferred tax rate, which is the tax rate preferred by the low-risk
group, since this tax rate has the highest costs. The cost of transferring income from
one state to the other is the same as above, but the weight on the two states is given in
the preferences are heterogeneous. Hence the beneÞts equal the costs at diﬀerent levels
of insurance.
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3.1 Introduction of a private alternative
We see that when σH < 1/2 and σL < 1/2, the realized tax rate is t∗M , which is lower than
the preferred tax rate for the L-group and higher than the preferred tax rate for the H-
group. The realized degree of social insurance is thus lower than preferred for the L-group,
and this may lead to a demand for an optional additional private insurance. However the
L-group is the group with the highest probability of losing their job. The members of
this group are thereby the least attractive customers for the private insurance company.
If the insurance company can observe the risk of each group, the price oﬀered for private
insurance is higher the higher the risk of losing the job. If the risks cannot be observed,
we have an asymmetric information situation. If this is the case, the appropriate solution
is a perfect Baysian equilibrium. My focus is not on informational aspects though, and I
limit the subject by assuming that the risks are observable.
In what way is the solution aﬀected by allowing for a private additional insurance? Pri-
vate insurance can either be a supplement or an alternative to social insurance. As before,
I assume that it is oﬀered as a supplement. The insurance company oﬀers insurance-cover
to group i in an amount Qi at a price qi. Expected proÞt for the insurance company for
group i is given by
E [Πi] = piqiQi + (1− pi)(qiQi −Qi)−K = qiQi − (1− pi)Qi −K, (24)
where K is the Þxed costs. We assume that the insurance company is risk neutral, and
chooses the price that maximizes (24) given the consumers optimal choice of Qi as a
function of the price. As in section two, a necessary condition for non-negative proÞts for
each group of customers is that qi ≥ 1− pi.
The demander has an after-tax income IE = (1 − t)w if he is employed and IN =
p¯
1−p¯τ (t)w if he is unemployed. He may buy additional insurance in the private marked.
Consumption is then given by
CiE = IE − qiQi = (1− t)w − qiQi (25)
CiN = IN − qiQ+Qi =
p¯
1− p¯τ (t)w +Qi(1− qi) (26)
The consumer maximizes his expected utility given the tax rate, (25) and (26). The
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Þrst-order condition is
MRSiN,E =
1− pi
pi
u0(CN )
u0(CE)
=
qi
1− qi ≡ P
i
p, (27)
if he demands additional insurance. Pp is the price in the private marked on consumption
when not employed in terms of consumption when employed. (27) deÞnes the demanded
amount of additional insurance as a function of the price, Qi(qi).
The price on private insurance varies from group to group, the price being lower, the
lower the probability of keeping their job, pi
qL > qM > qH ,
which in turn makes the marginal relative price on more consumption when not employed
lower, the lower the probability
PLp > P
M
p > P
H
p
Group i has a positive demand as long as their marginal value of additional insurance at
the realized tax rate, t∗, exceeds the marginal relative price
MRSiN,E(t
∗) > P ip ⇔ Qi(qi) > 0
If this is the case, the optimal amount of private insurance is given from (27).
A positive demand of private insurance may have consequences for the preferred tax
rate. If the costs of insurance are lower through the private insurance system than through
the social insurance system, it is beneÞcial to make private insurance a higher share of
the overall degree of insurance. Social insurance is preferred over private insurance only
as long the relative price is lower. The optimal composition of the insurance is the one
that minimizes the costs of insurance. The social insurance is preferred up to the point
where the private insurance oﬀers insurance at a lower cost. If optimal demand for private
insurance is positive, the optimal level of social insurance is implicitly given by the cost-
eﬃcient tax rate, ti. The cost-eﬃcient tax rate is the tax rate that equals the relative
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price on social and private insurance and is deÞned by
Ps(ti) = P
i
p
p¯
1− p¯
1
τ 0(ti)
=
qi
1− qi
τ 0(ti) =
1− qi
qi
1− p¯
p¯
(28)
When the deadweight costs of taxation are increasing, i.e. τ 00 < 0, Ps(t∗) is an increasing
function of the tax rate. Social insurance is preferred as long as this insurance form is less
costly than private insurance. By raising the tax rate, the degree of insurance rises but
so does the price. If you want the degree of insurance to be higher, but this makes the
price on social insurance higher than the price on private insurance, it is better to choose
private than social insurance. The lower the price on private insurance is, the lower is
the cost-eﬃcient tax rate. Since the group with the lowest probability of losing their job
is oﬀered the lowest price we have
tL > tM > tH
We remember that qi ≥ 1 − pi, pH > pM = p¯ > pL, and τ 0(0) = 1. Thus for i = L, the
right-hand side of (28) is greater than one. For i = M , it is equal to one if qM = 1 − p¯.
Hence tL > 0, tM = 0 iﬀ qM = 1 − p¯ and tH = 0 for some qH > 1 − pH . An actuarially
fair premium on private insurance is not suﬃcient for the L-group to want remove the
social insurance altogether, it is necessary and suﬃcient for the M-group and it suﬃcient,
but not necessary for the H-group. The reason for this is that the H-group in a way is
subsidizing the L-group through the social insurance system and that there are no such
eﬀects in the private insurance system.
If the preferred tax rate without an additional private insurance is lower than the cost-
eﬃcient tax rate, the optimal demand for private insurance is non-positive. The preferred
tax rate is then unaﬀected by the private alternative. If it is higher, the introduction of
a private alternative lowers the preferred tax rate to its cost-eﬃcient level.
What the eﬀects of the introduction of a private alternative are, depends on whether
the diﬀerent groups have a positive optimal demand for private insurance or not. Although
the L-group is insured in a lower degree in the social system than preferred, and may thus
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demand additional private insurance, it does not necessarily mean that their optimal
demand is positive. For this group, the optimal solution could just be a higher degree
of social insurance, but this is not realized because the degree of social insurance is
collectively decided. If there are no deadweight costs of taxation, there exists no private
insurance alternative that can compete with the social insurance and make a non-negative
proÞt.
The H-group prefers a lower level of social insurance than realized and has to be oﬀered
a price on private insurance that is suﬃciently lower than the marginal relative costs
of social insurance without the private alternative. Hence this group may not demand
additional insurance even if it is attractive to the L-group which faces lower marginal
relative costs of social insurance. Even so, the preferred tax rate may be aﬀected by the
introduction of the private alternative. The optimal insurance composition may involve
private insurance, but the optimal degree of private insurance may be zero if the degree
of social insurance is higher than optimal.
For the M-group, the situation is as in section two. If there is a positive demand
for private insurance for this group, it is because the price oﬀered on private insurance
is lower than the price on social insurance, at the preferred degree of social insurance
without a private alternative. Hence, if this group demands additional private insurance
for t = t∗M , their preferred tax rate is lowered to tM .
In the following I assume that the private insurance marked is such that the price
oﬀered makes optimal demand for private insurance positive for the H- and M-groups,
but not for the L-group. This may be the case if the impact of the subsidizing eﬀects
in the social insurance are large (pH/pL is large) relative to the costs of taxation for the
L-group, and thus involves no private insurance in the optimal solution.
A positive optimal demand for private insurance for the M- and H-group implies that
the preferred tax rate is the cost-eﬃcient tax rate
t∗M = tM > tH = t
∗
H
The preferred tax rate for the L-group is as before given by the trade-oﬀ between the
costs and beneÞts of social insurance. We remember that this tax rate was higher than
the preferred tax rate for the two other groups without a private alternative, because of
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the subsidizing eﬀects and that if the optimal demand for private insurance is positive,
this reduces the preferred tax rate to the cost-eﬃcient level.
If both the M- and H-group have a positive optimal demand for private insurance,
the introduction of the private alternative implies a majority in favor of reducing the tax
rate, as long as σL < 1/2. This implies a welfare loss for the L-group. Lowering the tax
rate means that the beneÞts of the subsidizing eﬀects are reduced and that the preferred
degree of insurance has to involve a higher degree of private insurance, which is more
costly for this group than social insurance.
This shows that even if it is in the interests of the L-group to acquire an additional
private insurance, because the degree of social insurance is lower than optimal, an intro-
duction of a private insurance alternative may harm this group.
4 Heterogeneous income
In this version of the model the three groups have the same probability of keeping their
jobs, p, but diﬀerent wages, wH > wM > wL. Total tax-income is now
T (t) = τ (t) (σHwH + σMwM + σLwL) p = τ(t)w¯p, (29)
where
w¯ = σHwH + σMwM + σLwL (30)
is the average wage for those employed. For comparison, I assume that the average wage
is equal to the median wage, w¯ = wM , and that this is equal to the wage in section two.
The consumption of an employed person in group i is given by.
CiE = (1− t)wi (31)
Consumption of an unemployed person is as before and unrelated to prior earnings. Pref-
erences of a member of group i is represented by the utility-function
vi(C) = pu(C
i
E) + (1− p)u(CN) (32)
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The Þrst-order condition for the optimal tax rate for a member of group i:
−pu0(CiE)wi + (1− p)u0(CN)
p
1− pτ
0(t)w¯ = 0
MRSN,i ≡ 1− p
p
u0(CN )
u0(CiE)
=
1− p
p
wi
w¯
1
τ 0(t)
≡ P is(t∗i ) (33)
The price on consumption when not employed in terms of consumption when employed
is no longer identical for all individuals, but increasing in wi. That means that for a
given t, PHs > P
M
s > P
L
c . High-wage earners has to pay more for one unit of consumption
when not employed in terms of consumption when employed and thus prefer a lower
degree of insurance, CN/CE. This does not necessarily mean that the preferred tax rate
is decreasing in the wage. High-wage earners have a higher initial level of consumption
when employed and may have a higher preferred level of consumption when not employed
although the preferred degree of insurance is lower. As in section two, the preferred degree
of insurance, and thereby t∗i , is increasing in the degree of risk aversion and decreasing in
the deadweight costs of taxation.
What are the eﬀects of a mean preserving spread in the wages, i.e. that wH increases,
wL decreases with w¯ is constant? We see that this increases PHc and decreases P
L
c . A
mean preserving spread thus reduces the preferred degree of insurance and tax rate for
the high income earners and increases the preferred degree of insurance and tax rate for
the low income earners.
We view the preferred tax rates in Figure 1 and 2, showing the marginal costs and
beneÞts of the welfare-state as functions of the tax rate.
The beneÞts are the same for all three groups, since unemployment-beneÞt is unrelated
to prior earnings. The marginal beneÞts of the tax rate is measured by pu0(CN)τ 0(t)w¯,
with
∂pu0(CN)τ 0(t)wM
∂t
= pu00(CN)τ 0(t)w¯2 + pu0(CN )τ 00(t)w¯ < 0 (34)
The beneÞts are a decreasing function of the tax rate if τ 00 ≤ 0 and we have risk aversion,
u00(C) < 0. The beneÞt from the last amount taxed, in terms of value of consumption
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when not employed, is lower the higher the tax rate is. This is the same for Figure 1 and
2.
The marginal costs are measured by pu0(CiE)wi , with
∂pu0(CiE)wi
∂t
= −pu00(CiE)w2i > 0 (35)
The costs are increasing in the tax rate, as long as u00 < 0.
What is the relation between the wage and the costs?
∂pu0(CiE)wi
∂wi
= p
£
u00(CiE)(1− t)wi + u0(CiE)
¤
(36)
The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, µ, (which is assumed constant here) is deÞned as
µ ≡ −u
00(C)
u0(C)
C
According to Arrow (1965) the relative risk aversion is the elasticity of the marginal utility
of wealth.
If we insert for u00(C) = − µ
C
u0(C) and CiE = (1− t)wi in (36), we get
∂pu0(CiE)wi
∂wi
= pu0(CiE) [1− µ] (37)
The marginal costs of the tax rate are lower, the higher the wage if µ > 1. Moreover
∂2pu0(CiE)wi
∂wi∂t
= −pu00(CiE)wi [1− µ] < 0 (38)
,when µ > 1 and u00(CiE) < 0.
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pu´(CN)τ´(t)wM
pu´(CiE)wi
t*i
t
Figure 1: µ = 1, i = L,M,H
pu´(CME)wM
pu´(CHE)wH
t*L t*M t*H
pu´(CN)τ´(t)wM
pu´(CLE)wL
t
Figure 2: µ > 1
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Figure 1 shows the case when µ = 1 as in the case when u(C) = lnC. In this case
pu0(CiE)wi =
p
(1−t) and the three cost-curves are identical. The marginal costs of each
dollar taxed are unrelated to the pre-tax income. If the beneÞts and the costs of every
dollar taxed are the same for all three groups, the preferred tax rate is the same and we
have no conßicts of interests. This means that t∗i = t
∗ and
MRSN,i = P
i
s(t
∗) (39)
for all three groups.
Figure 2 shows the case when µ > 1. The diﬀerent cost-curves are lower, the higher
the income and the diﬀerences are increasing. An income increase has two eﬀects on the
marginal costs of the tax rate: one positive and one negative. The positive eﬀect is that
higher income leads to higher consumption when employed, making the tax more costly.
The negative one is that more income reduces the marginal utility of consumption when
employed when we have risk aversion, making the tax less costly. When µ > 1, as seen
in Figure 2, the negative eﬀect dominates, making the marginal costs of the tax rate
decreasing in the wage, with increasing diﬀerences. Every dollar taxed is more costly to
the low income earners and their costs are increasing more rapidly than for higher income
levels:
pu0(CHE )wH < pu
0(CME )wM < pu
0(CLE)wL (40)
∂pu0(CLE)wL
∂t
>
∂pu0(CME )wM
∂t
>
∂pu0(CHE )wH
∂t
(41)
Thus, if µ > 1, the marginal beneÞts of the tax rate equals the marginal costs at a higher
level the higher income is. The preferred tax rate is an increasing function of the wage
t∗H > t
∗
M > t
∗
L
This means that the demand for social insurance is increasing in income even though the
cost of social insurance is increasing in income as well. This means that insurance is a
normal good, with demand increasing when income increases.
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Moreover wH/wM > 1 and wL/wM < 1. This implies, if τ 00(t) ≤ 0, that
PHs (t
∗
H) > P
M
s (t
∗
M) > P
L
c (t
∗
L)
If µ > 1, we thus have conßicts of interests, with t∗H > t
∗
M > t
∗
L. If σL < 1/2 and
σH < 1/2, the median voter is in the M-group and the realized tax rate is t∗M . The
realized tax rate is thus lower than the preferred tax rate for the high-wage group, and
higher than preferred for the low-wage group, even though the costs of insurance are higher
for the high income group. The high-wage earners prefers a higher degree of insurance,
i.e. a higher tax rate and the low-wage earners prefer a lower degree of insurance, i.e. a
lower tax rate:
MRSN,L < P
L
c (t
∗)
MRSN,M = P
M
s (t
∗)
MRSN,H > P
H
s (t
∗)
We see that when
wM = w¯ ⇔ PMs =
p
1− p
1
τ 0(t)
= Ps,
Ps being the price in the section with a homogeneous population. Then (33) for i = M
is identical to (5) and the realized tax rate is identical to the one in section one.
With no deadweight costs of taxation, τ(t) = t ,
P is =
1− p
p
wi
w¯
The price is the relative weight on consumption multiplied by the wage relative to the
average wage. If wi = wM , the price is equal to the relative weight on consumption
and a risk averse individual prefers perfect insurance. Remember that wH > wM >
wL. Therefore, the L−group prefers over-insurance and the H-group prefers incomplete
insurance, when there are no deadweight costs of taxation. The reason for this is the
redistributive element of the social insurance. The high-wage earners are subsidizing the
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low-wage earners in the social insurance system. With no deadweight costs of taxation
we have the following for the M-group:
w¯ = wM ⇔ PMs =
1− p
p
⇔ CN = CME
With w¯ = wM and no deadweight cost, PMs =
1−p
p
, the social insurance system oﬀers
insurance at an actuarially fair premium for the median voter. He is able to transfer
consumption from when being employed to when not being employed at a relative price
equal to the relative weight on consumption. If the individual is risk averse, he prefers
to have equal consumption regardless of his employment status. The individuals prefer a
lower degree of insurance the higher the price.
4.1 Introduction of a private insurance alternative
In what way is the preferred tax rates and hence possibly the realized tax rate, aﬀected
by the introduction of a private alternative? As in section two I assume that the insur-
ance company maximizes expected proÞt. I assume that there is no possibility of price
discrimination. Insurance is oﬀered at a price independent of income.
The demander has an after-tax income I iE = (1 − t)wi if he is employed and IN =
p
1−pτ (t)w¯ if he is unemployed. He may buy additional insurance in the private marked.
Consumption is given by
CiE = I
i
E − qQi = (1− t)wi − qQi (42)
CiN = IN − qQi +Qi =
p
1− pτ (t)w¯ +Qi(1− q) (43)
Section two showed that the consumers choose a level of insurance that makes the
marginal rate of substitution between the two income states equal to the relative price on
private insurance:
MRSN,i =
1− p
p
u0(CN)
u0(CiE)
=
q
1− q ≡ Pp (44)
if he demands additional insurance. Pp is the same price as in section 2. (44) deÞnes the
demanded amount of additional insurance for group i as a function of the price, Qi(q).
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As before, a necessary condition for a non-negative proÞts that q ≥ 1− p. If there are
no Þxed costs, it is also a suﬃcient condition. Any q < 1 − p gives a negative expected
proÞt, and makes the insurance company economically non-viable.
Proposition 2 Private insurance is more attractive the higher the income.
The consumer demands additional insurance only if his marginal value of consumption
when not employed in terms of his marginal value of consumption when employed at the
initial level, exceeds the price.
MRS0N,i ≡
1− p
p
u0(IN)
u0(I iE)
> Pp (45)
This is a suﬃcient and necessary condition for the demand for group i to be positive,
Qi > 0. If (45) does not hold for i = H,M,L, there will be no demand, and no marked
for additional insurance. Because the initial income is higher, the higher the wage, we
have that
MRS0N,H > MRS
0
N,M > MRS
0
N,L
Hence, if the high income earners have a non-positive demand for private insurance, the
demand is non-positive for the two other groups as well. Moreover, if the demand is
positive for the low income earners, it is positive for the two other groups as well.
If µ = 1, the realized tax rate, t∗, is optimal for all three groups. If this is the realized
tax rate as well, we have:
MRS0N,i =
1− p
p
u0(IN)
u0(I iE)
= P is(t
∗) (46)
where P is(t) is deÞned in (33). Pp < P
i
s(t
∗) is then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
Qi(q) > 0.
The H-group pays the highest price on social insurance, PHs (t
∗) > PMs (t
∗) > PLc (t
∗).
Hence for µ = 1, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a positive demand for private
insurance is that Pp < PHs (t
∗). The price on consumption when not employed through
the private insurance system has to be lower than the price the H-group pays through
the social insurance system. For the insurance company to be economically viable this
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demand has to make the proÞts non-negative.
With no Þxed costs in the insurance marked, the lowest q that makes the proÞts
non-negative is q = 1− p. Then positive demand requires
Pp =
q
1− q =
1− p
p
<
1− p
p
wH
w¯
1
τ 0(t∗)
= PHs (t
∗)
Recall that wH
w¯
> 1 and τ 0(t∗) ≤ 1. There are redistributive eﬀects in the social insurance
system. A worker earning a higher-than-average wage is subsidizing the workers earning
a lower than average wage in the social insurance system. In the private insurance system
there are no subsidizing eﬀects. The private insurance system can thus oﬀer a price
that is lower for the high-wage earners than the price the social insurance system oﬀers,
depending on the size of the Þxed costs in the private marked. A suﬃcient condition for
an economically viable insurance marked, is that there are no Þxed costs in the insurance
marked, even when there are no deadweight costs of taxation.
If µ > 1, the previous section showed that the preferred tax rate is increasing in the
wage. If the median voter is in the M-group, the realized tax rate is t∗M , the H-group
prefers a higher tax rate and the L-group prefers a lower tax rate. Both the H- and L-
group are dissatisÞed with the amount of social insurance. At the realized relative price
on consumption when not employed, the H-group prefers a higher, and the L-group a
lower degree of insurance than oﬀered through the social insurance system. The relative
value of more consumption when not employed is higher than the costs for the H-group
and lower for the L-group. In other words, the marginal rate of substitution is higher
than the price for the H-group and lower than the price for the L-group:
MRS0N,H > P
H
s (t
∗
M) > MRS
0
N,M = P
M
s (t
∗
M) > P
L
c (t
∗
M) > MRS
0
N,L
Then Pp < PHs (t
∗) is no longer a necessary condition for QH(q) > 0, but a suﬃcient one.
We may have Pp > PHs (t
∗
M) and still have MRS
0
N,H > Pp, thus making the demand for
additional insurance positive. With µ > 1 , the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
viability is that MRS0N,H > Pp and that this demand makes the proÞts non-negative.
The realized tax rate is the optimal tax rate for the M-group and Pp < PMs (t
∗) is still a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the demand for the M-group to be positive. Pp <
PLc (t
∗
M) is a necessary condition for a positive demand for the L-group, but not a suﬃcient
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one, since this group is paying a tax higher than optimal and thus a higher degree of
insurance than optimal at the given price.
As in section two, an introduction of a private insurance is likely to aﬀect the preferred
tax rate for the three groups. If the private alternative oﬀers insurance that is less costly,
we expect a reduction in the preferred tax rate. Social insurance is preferred as long as the
price on consumption when not employed is lower through the social insurance system
than through the private insurance system (Pp > P is(t
∗
i )). If there are no deadweight
costs of taxation, the price through the social insurance system is a constant, and is
either greater or smaller than the price oﬀered through the private insurance system for
all tax rates. The L-group is being subsidized in the social insurance system, paying an
actuarially more-than-fair premium without any deadweight costs. No private alternative
can compete with that. The M-group is paying an actuarially fair premium in the social
insurance system, and the best the private insurance company can do is to oﬀer the same
price. This makes the M-group indiﬀerent in regards to the two insurance forms, but
leaves the insurance company with a non-positive proÞt (negative in the presence of Þxed
costs). With no deadweight costs of taxation, the only group who may beneÞt on private
insurance, is the H-group, who is paying an actuarially less-than-fair premium.
When we have increasing deadweight costs of taxation, P is(t) is no longer a constant,
but an increasing function of the tax rate. Social insurance is preferred as long as this
insurance form is cheaper than private insurance. By raising the tax rate, the degree of
insurance rises but so does the price. If you want the degree of insurance to be higher,
but this makes the price on social insurance higher than the price on private insurance,
it is better to choose private than social insurance.
Proposition 3 The cost-eﬃcient tax rate is higher the lower the income
The cost-eﬃcient tax rate for group i, ti, is the one that equals the two prices and is
deÞned by:
P is(ti) = Pp
1− p
p
wi
w¯
1
τ 0(ti)
=
q
1− q
τ 0(ti) =
1− q
q
1− p
p
wi
w¯
(47)
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τ 00 ≤ 0 and wH > wM = w¯ > wL This means that
tL > tM > tH
If the right hand side of (47) is greater or equal to one, social insurance is more
expensive than private insurance for all values of t, since τ 0(0) = 1. If this is the case,
ti = 0. We remember that q ≥ 1 − p. This means that tL > 0 and tM > 0 if q > 1 − p.
A suﬃcient and necessary condition for tH = 0 is
1− q
q
1− p
p
wH
w¯
≥ 1
q ≤ (1− p)wH
(1− p)wH + pw¯ > 1− p (48)
This means that the preferred tax rate for the H-group is zero even for an actuarially
less-than-fair premium on private insurance.
As before, consumption when not employed at this tax rate is given by
CiN ≡
p
1− pτ (
ti)w¯ (49)
CiN is the highest amount of consumption when not employed where social insurance is
preferred over private insurance for group i. This consumption is increasing in ti and thus
decreasing in wi, i.e. CLN > C
M
N > C
H
N . Any CN higher than C
i
N is less costly in the
private marked than through the social insurance system for group i. If ti = 0⇔ CiN = 0.
The optimal budget constraint for group i is thus given by
CiE = wi − P is(t)CN for 0 ≤ CN ≤ CiN (50)
CiE = wi − PpCN for CN > CiN (51)
The optimal degree of insurance is given by
MRSN,i = Pp, (52)
if at optimum, there is a demand for private insurance, i.e. Q∗i > 0, and C
∗
N >
CiN . If
this is the case the preferred tax rate is that which equals the costs, t∗i = ti. If there is no
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demand for private insurance at optimum, i.e. Q∗i = 0 and C
∗
N ≤ CiN , the optimal degree
of insurance is given by
MRSN,i = P
i
s(t
∗
i ) ≤ Pp (53)
If this is the case, the optimal tax rate is unaﬀected by the introduction of the private
alternative and makes the price on the social insurance lower than on the private, t∗i < ti.
We remember that a mean preserving spread in the wages increases PHs and decreases
PLs . Increasing wage inequality thus makes private insurance more attractive to the high-
income earners and less attractive to the low-income earners.
In the case with increasing deadweight costs of taxation, the costs of more consumption
when not employed is increasing when insured socially. If, at CN = CiN , the marginal
relative value of more consumption when not employed exceeds the price, it would increase
welfare to increase the degree of insurance. However, it is less costly to get the additional
insurance in the private marked because of the increasing deadweight costs of taxation.
If the optimal degree of taxation for group i implies that CN > CiN , the preferred tax rate
is t∗i = ti. If the preferred tax rate implies that CN < C
i
N , the preferred tax rate is given
by (53). As in section two, individuals that have a positive optimal demand for private
insurance have a lower preferred tax rate than without a private insurance alternative.
One important aspect of this insight is that µ > 1 no longer is a necessary condition
for conßicts of interests. If at least one group has a positive optimal demand for private
insurance, the preferred tax rates are no longer identical for the three groups. The group(s)
having a positive optimal demand, has a preferred tax rate diﬀering from the ones without
a positive optimal demand. If all three groups have a positive demand, the preferred tax
rate is a decreasing function of the wage, tL > tM > tH .
If the introduction of a private insurance alternative aﬀects the preferred tax rate, the
realized tax rate may be aﬀected as well. There may be a majority in favor of lowering the
tax rate even though private insurance is not attractive to a majority. The eﬀect on the
realized tax rate depends among other things on which of the three groups have positive
optimal demands for private insurance. Proposition 2 stated that private insurance is
more attractive the higher the income. We thus have three cases to consider: only the
high-income earners have a positive optimal demand, both the high- and median-income
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earners have a positive optimal demand, all three groups have a positive optimal demand.
4.1.1 Only the high-income earners have a positive optimal demand
A positive optimal demand for additional private insurance by only the high income
earners, means that
PHs (t
∗
H = tH) = Pp > P
M
s (t
∗
M) > P
L
c (t
∗
L) (54)
It follows that t∗M and t
∗
L are unaﬀected by the private alternative and that the preferred
tax rate for the H-group, t∗H , is lower than the preferred tax rate without the private
alternative. An introduction of a private supplemental insurance leads to a gain for the
high-income group from two potential sources. Firstly, private insurance makes it possible
to get additional insurance at the given level of the tax rate. Secondly, a reduction in the
preferred tax rate may lead to a reduction in the realized tax rate. If there is a reduction
in the realized tax rate, the high-income earner is able to switch from social insurance
to the, for them, less costly private insurance. If µ = 1, the preferred tax rates were
identical without private insurance. A reduction in the preferred tax rate for the high
income earners thus makes this tax rate lower than the preferred tax rates for the two
other groups:
t∗L = t
∗
M > t
∗
H
The private alternative then has no eﬀect on the realized tax rate as long as σH < 1/2.
The only eﬀect is that the high-income earners demands additional insurance and are
made better oﬀ.
If µ > 1, the preferred tax rates were increasing in the wage without private insurance.
The low-income earners wish to reduce the tax rate. If σM < 1/2, the reduction in the
preferred tax rate for the high income earners following the introduction of the private
insurance alternative may aﬀect the realized tax rate.
Proposition 4 The introduction of a private insurance that is only attractive to the share
of the population with the highest income, implies a coalition of the high- and low-income
earners and a majority in favor of lowering the tax rate, as long as σM < 1/2 and µ > 1.
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If σM < 1/2, the introduction of the private insurance alternative shifts the political
center from the median income earners as long as t∗H < t
∗
M .
t∗H is deÞned from
1− p
p
1
τ 0(t∗H)
wH
wM
=
q
1− q (55)
From this expression we get that
1− p
p
=
q
1− q
wM
wH
τ 0(t∗H) (56)
PMs (t
∗
M) is deÞned from
PMs (t
∗
M) =
1− p
p
1
τ 0(t∗M)
(57)
We insert for 1−p
p
from (56) and get
PMs (t
∗
M) =
q
1− q
wM
wH
τ 0(t∗H)
τ 0(t∗M)
⇒
τ 0(t∗H)
τ 0(t∗M)
=
1− q
q
PMs (t
∗
M)
wH
wM
⇒
τ 0(t∗H)
τ 0(t∗M)
=
PHs (t
∗
M)
Pp
(58)
Since τ 00 < 0 in the case of increasing deadweight costs, t∗H < t
∗
M as long as the
right-hand side of (58) is greater than one. This is equivalent to
PHs (t
∗
M) > Pp (59)
Which is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a positive demand for private
insurance.
The equivalent condition for the introduction to lower the tax rate of the high income
earners below that of the low income earners is:
PHs (t
∗
L) > Pp (60)
We remember that for µ > 1, t∗M > t
∗
L without private insurance. Condition (60) is
34
thus stricter than condition (59) for µ > 1. Condition (60) is more likely to hold the
greater the wage inequality. For µ = 1, the two conditions are equivalent (t∗M = t
∗
L).
When µ > 1, the introduction of a private insurance alternative leads to an Ends-
against-mean situation. It is both in the high- and low-income earners interests to lower
the tax rate. As long as σM < 1/2, this means that the median voter falls outside the
M-group. This can be seen as a loss of political power for this group. The realized tax
rate is thus no longer the optimal tax rate for this group. This may change their decision
towards the private insurance, but nevertheless implies a welfare loss.
The eﬀects of the introduction of a private insurance alternative that is only attractive
to the high income earners can be summarized as follows:
 The preferred tax rate of the high income earners is reduced
1. If σM > 1/2 and/or µ = 1, the realized tax rate is unchanged
2. If σM < 1/2 and µ > 1, the realized tax rate is reduced
(a) If condition (60) does not hold, the realized tax rate is t∗H .
(b) If condition (60) holds, the realized tax rate is t∗L.
 The consequences for the diﬀerent groups depend on what the realized tax rate is:
— Case 1: The situation is unchanged for the M- and L-groups. The H-group has
a gain from being allowed additional insurance. Private insurance reduces the
conßicts of interests in the society.
— Case 2: The M-group suﬀers a welfare loss, when shifted outside the political
center. The tax rate is not the cost-eﬃcient tax rate for this group anymore.
For the same degree of insurance as before the median income earners has
to pay a higher price, because the level of social insurance is lower and that
the private insurance has a higher cost for this group at this level of social
insurance.
— Case 2a: Both the H- and L-group have a welfare gain. The gain for the H-
group comes from two sources. Firstly they are allowed an additional insurance.
Secondly the tax rate is reduced to this groups cost-eﬃcient level. The gain
for the L-group comes from reducing the level of social insurance, which was
higher than optimal (and still is) for this group
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— Case 2b: There is a welfare gain for the L-group because the tax rate now is
at its optimal level for this group. The eﬀect for the H-group is not clear,
because the tax rate now is below the cost-eﬃcient level
Hence private insurance under condition (54) cannot hurt the low income earners and
cannot beneÞt the median income earners.
If the median income earners are in a minority, an introduction of a private insurance
leads to a welfare loss for this group, as long as µ > 1. The private insurance reduces
the preferred tax rate for the high income earners to a level lower than the preferred tax
rate for the middle group, which results in a realized tax rate lower than optimal for the
median income earners. This may lead to a positive demand of private insurance since
the degree of insurance is lower than the preferred degree
MRSN,M(t
∗
H) > P
M
s (t
∗),
and this makes the marginal value of more insurance higher. The demand is positive if
MRSN,M(t
∗
H) > Pp
However, the result is nevertheless a welfare loss for the median income earner. A tax rate
lower than optimal means, by deÞnition, a welfare loss. The source of this potential loss is
the potential ends-against-middle situation that may result in that the median voter falls
outside this group, which is a loss of political power. It is in both the H- and L-groups
interests to have a tax rate below that of t∗M .
With large deadweight costs of taxation relative to the costs of the private insurance,
the private insurance alternative may be attractive to the median income earners as well.
Social insurance involves no subsidizing eﬀects for the median income earners. Hence, a
positive demand for private insurance for this group implies that the deadweight costs of
taxation are making social insurance more costly than the private insurance. If this is the
case, the preferred tax rate for this group is reduced. This may have consequences for the
realized tax rate as well.
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4.1.2 Both the high- and median-income earners have a positive optimal
demand
If the price on the private insurance is such that both the H- and M-group have a positive
optimal demand for additional insurance, the results are diﬀerent. This means that
PHs (t
∗
H = tH) = P
M
s (t
∗
M = tM) = Pp > P
L
c (t
∗
L) (61)
The optimal tax rate for the H- and M-groups are set such that the relative price on
consumption when not employed is equal in the two insurance forms, thus reducing the
preferred tax rates for these two groups. We recall that tM > tH , thus making the
preferred tax rate for the high income group lower than for the median income group.
Proposition 5 The introduction of a private insurance alternative that is preferred by a
majority of the population, reduces the realized tax rate below the preferred tax rate of the
poor, if µ = 1 or if the wage diﬀerences are suﬃciently large.
In the case of µ = 1, the initial tax rate is the optimal for the low income group. The
relationship between the preferred tax rates then are
t∗L > t
∗
M > t
∗
H (62)
The median voter is in the M-group and the realized tax rate is t∗M = tM , which is lower
than the realized tax rate without a private alternative. A reduction makes the L-group
worse oﬀ, making the degree of social insurance lower than optimal. This may aﬀect this
groups decision regarding the private insurance. A tax rate lower than optimal for this
group, t∗ < t∗L, implies that
MRSN,L > P
L
c (t
∗)
This group has a positive demand if the relative marginal utility at the realized tax rate
exceeds the relative marginal price on private insurance. A positive demand for private
insurance limits the welfare loss for the low income earners of a reduction in the realized
tax rate. The total eﬀect nevertheless is a welfare loss, because the initial level was
optimal.
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If µ > 1, the results are less clear. If there is a positive optimal demand for private
insurance for the H- and M-group, the preferred tax rates are the cost-eﬃcient tax rates
deÞned in (47). The preferred tax rate for the L-group is deÞned from the trade-oﬀ
between the costs and gains of social insurance in equation (33). Recall that this tax rate
is higher the higher the degree of risk aversion, the lower the deadweight costs of taxation
and the higher the wage inequality. Using the same method as above, we Þnd that the
condition for the preferred tax rate of the M-group to be lower than the preferred tax rate
for the L-group is
PMs (t
∗
L) > Pp (63)
The condition for the preferred tax rate of the H-group to be lower than the preferred tax
rate for the L-group is
PHs (t
∗
L) > Pp (64)
Since wH > wM , the former condition is stricter. If condition (63) holds, we have that
t∗L > t
∗
M > t
∗
H . There is a majority in favor of reducing the tax rate below that of the
preferred tax rate for the low-income earners. For given values of µ, τ 0 and q, condition
(63) is more likely to hold the greater the wage diﬀerences are.
If the private insurance is attractive to both the H- and M-group the preferred tax
rates for both these groups decreases, and the realized tax rate decreases as well. What the
realized tax rate is in this situation depends on the degree of risk aversion, the deadweight
costs of taxation, the price on the private insurance and the wage diﬀerences. The eﬀects
of the introduction of a private insurance alternative that is attractive to both the high-
and median income earners can be summarized as follows:
 The preferred tax rates of the high and medium income earners are reduced
 The realized tax rate is reduced.
1. If σM > 1/2 and/or condition (63) holds, the realized tax rate is t∗M = tM .If
condition (63) holds t∗L > t
∗
M > t
∗
H .
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2. If σM < 1/2 and condition (63) does not hold, the realized tax rate is lower
than t∗M .
(a) If condition (64) holds, t∗M > t
∗
L > t
∗
H , and the realized tax rate is t
∗
L.
(b) If condition (64) does not hold, t∗M > t
∗
H > t
∗
L, and the realized tax rate is
t∗H .
 The consequences for the diﬀerent groups depend on what the realized tax rate is
— Case 1: In this case the median voter is in the M-group and the realized tax
rate is t∗M = tM , which is lower than without the private insurance. It is also
lower than the preferred tax rate for the L-group. This may lead to a positive
demand for private insurance for the L-group as well even though the optimal
demand is zero, since the degree of insurance is lower than the preferred degree
MRSN,L(t
∗) > PLc (t
∗),
and this makes the marginal value of more insurance higher. The demand is
positive if
MRSN,L(t
∗) > Pp
In this case both the H- and M-groups are made better oﬀ. The gain for the
M-group is that the deadweight costs of taxation are reduced to a level that
makes the costs of insurance equal in the two diﬀerent forms of insurance.
The H-group has an additional gain by reducing the amount of subsidies to
the L-group. The L-group may be made worse oﬀ, since the degree of social
insurance is lower than optimal. However, if µ > 1 the realized tax rate without
a private alternative was higher than optimal for the L-group. Therefore a tax
rate lower than optimal is a necessary, but not a suﬃcient condition for the
private alternative to lead to welfare loss for the L-group. A welfare loss for
the L-group is possible if the level of insurance associated with this realized tax
rate involves risk in such an amount that this is more costly than the excessive
costs of the realized tax rate without the private alternative. In the case of
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µ > 1, the tax rate without a private alternative was higher than optimal
for the L-group and involved excessive costs. The L-group may thus be made
better oﬀ by the reduction in the tax rate following the introduction of the
private alternative, if the reduction is not to large. In this case all groups
are made better oﬀ and the introduction leads to a more eﬃcient insurance
system, reducing the deadweight costs of taxation. However the reduction in
the realized tax rate may very well be so large that the L-group is made worse
oﬀ, exposing this group to a great amount of risk and reducing their welfare.
— Case 2a: In this case the realized tax rate is t∗L, if none of the groups have
a majority. The L- and the H-groups have a welfare gain. The gain for the
former is that the degree of insurance through the social insurance is reduced
to its optimal level. The gain for the latter is both in form of a higher degree
of insurance and that the more costly social insurance is reduced. The eﬀect
for the M-group is not clear. The reduction in the realized tax rate is larger
than the preferred reduction for this group. If the reduction is large enough,
the total eﬀect could be a welfare loss for the M-group, but the result can just
as well be a welfare gain. Even though the median income earner prefers a
higher degree of social insurance, the deadweight costs of taxation is reduced
and it is possible that a higher degree of consumption is attainable at a lower
costs.
— Case 2b: In this case the median voter is in the H-group, as long as σM < 1/2,
and the realized tax rate is t∗H = tH . This group is made better oﬀ and the
gain is partly because of a higher degree of insurance and partly because of
switching from the social insurance to the less costly private insurance. The
realized tax rate is closer to optimal for the L-group and the degree of insurance
is closer to optimal as well. The L-group is thus made better oﬀ as well. The
eﬀect for the M-group is still not clear, but in this case the tax rate is reduced
more than in the Þrst case and it is thus more probable that the introduction
of a private insurance leads to a welfare loss for the M-group.
The potential loss for the L-group has two potential sources. Firstly a lower tax
rate increases the amount of risk this group is exposed to, which is costly for a risk averse
40
individual. Secondly, a tax rate lower than optimal may make the L-group demand private
insurance, which for them involves switching from the social to the more costly private
insurance. The reason for the higher cost is the fact that the L-group is being subsidized
in the social insurance system, but not the private one.
4.1.3 All three groups have a positive optimal demand.
If all three groups have a positive optimal demand for private insurance, their preferred
tax rate is ti deÞned in (47). I have shown that
tL > tM > tH (65)
The median voter is in the M-group. Both the H- and M-group have a gain from the
introduction of the private insurance. The eﬀect for the L-group is not clear, but their
preferred tax rate is lower with a positive optimal demand for private insurance than
with a non-positive optimal demand. Hence it is less likely that the L-group has a loss in
welfare in this case.
Private insurance diﬀers from the social insurance in three aspects. Firstly, the price on
consumption when not employed in terms of consumption when employed is the same for
all three groups through the private insurance, while being increasing in the wage through
the social insurance. Secondly, the degree of private insurance is decided individually,
while the degree of social insurance is the result of a democratic process. Thirdly, the
price oﬀered through the social insurance is non-linear in the presence of deadweight costs
of taxation, while the price oﬀered through the private insurance is linear. The price on
one extra unit of consumption is higher, the higher the level of this consumption if attained
through the social insurance, but constant if attained through the private insurance. In
the case of µ = 1, there are no conßicts of interests in the absence of private insurance.
An introduction of a private insurance system then introduces conßicts of interests via
the Þrst aspect. In the case of µ > 1, there are conßicts of interests in the absence of
private insurance. An introduction of a private insurance system may reduce or change
these conßicts via both these aspects. The third aspect makes it possible to reduce the
amount of deadweight costs of taxation.
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5 Social mobility
In this section I examine the importance of social mobility in the heterogeneous-income
model. For simplicity I only consider social mobility in the middle group and only social
mobility upwards. This is represented in the model by a probability α, that members of
the middle group will receive a high wage, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. I disregard time-discounting
and the possibility that they can return to a lower wage. α can be viewed the probability
of a better job, net of the probability of losing that job in the future discounted over
time. Social mobility upward for the median income earners internalizes the interests of
the high-income earners. This is only interesting if the interests diﬀer. I start without a
private alternative.
The median income earners utility function is now:
vM(C) = p
£
(1− α)u(CME ) + αu(CHE )
¤
+ (1− p) u (CN) (66)
The average wage for those employed is:
w¯ = (σH + (1− α)σM)wH + ασMwM + σL, (67)
which I assume is the same average wage as in the model without social mobility and that
w¯ = wM .
Proposition 6 Social mobility upwards for the median income earners increases this
groups preferred tax rate in the absence of private insurance, as long as µ > 1
The Þrst-order condition for optimal tax rate for the median voter, t∗SM , is:
−p(1− α)u0(CME )w¯ − pαu0(CHE )wH + (1− p)u0(CN)
p
1− pw¯τ
0(t∗SM) = 0
, which can be written as
(1− α) p
1− p
u0(CME )
u0(CN)
+ α
p
1− p
u0(CHE )
u0(CN)
wH
w¯
=
p
1− pτ
0(t) =
1
PMs
(68)
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or
(1− α)pu0(CME )w¯ + αpu0(CHE )wH = pu0(CN )τ 0(t∗SM)w¯ (69)
The right-hand side of (68) is the weighed sum of the marginal rates of substitution
between consumption when employed and when not employed for the median and high
income earners, the weight being the probability for each income-state, with an additional
weight equal to the wage diﬀerences, wH/w¯, on the high income state. In this equation
the beneÞts are measured in terms of consumption when not employed.
I have shown that if µ = 1, the preferred tax rate is identical for all three groups
in the absence of private insurance. Hence social mobility makes no diﬀerence regarding
the preferred tax rate without a private insurance. If µ > 1, the preferred tax rates are
increasing in the wage. We see that if α = 0, (68) is identical to (33) for i = M and
t∗SM = t
∗
M . If α = 1, (68) is identical to (33) for i = H and t
∗
SM = t
∗
H . Thus, in the
intermediate case where 0 < α < 1, t∗M < t
∗
SM < t
∗
H . Social mobility upward for the
median income earner makes the preferred tax rate higher and closer to the preferred tax
rate for the high-income earners. t∗SM is closer to t
∗
H , the higher α and wH/w¯ is. A higher
tax rate implies that the preferred degree of insurance for the median income earner,
CN/C
M
E , is higher. Social mobility upward increases expected income. When insurance
is a normal good (which is implied by µ > 1), this increases demand for insurance and
makes the preferred tax rate higher.
We show this point in Figure 3, with the costs and beneÞts curves of the tax rate.
The left-hand-side of (69) is the weighed sum of the high- and medium-wage costs
curves. The right-hand side is as before the beneÞt-curve. I have previously shown that
u0(CME )w¯ > u
0(CHE )wH for all t, with µ > 1. This implies that
pu0(CHE )wH < (1− α)pu0(CME )w¯ + αpu0(CHE )wH < pu0(CME )w¯
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pu´(CN)τ´(t)wM
pu´(CME)wM
pu´(CHE)wH
t*M t*SM t*H t
(1-α) pu´(CME)wM
+αpu´(CHE)wH
Figure 3: Social mobility, µ > 1
A high-wage earner with µ > 1 prefers a higher tax rate than a medium-wage earner,
t∗SM > t
∗
M . Amedium-wage earner with social mobility upwards internalizes these interests
and thus prefers a higher tax rate than without social mobility. How higher the preferred
tax rate will be depends on α, the degree of social mobility, the wage diﬀerences wH/w¯,
the degree of relative risk aversion µ, and the cost of taxation, τ 0(t).
The preferred tax rate is higher
 the higher α
 the higher wH/w¯
 the higher µ
 the closer τ 0(t) is to one, i.e. the lower the deadweight costs of taxation
Social mobility leads to a higher tax rate. The low-wage earners are thus made worse
oﬀ, since they are the ones who prefer the lowest tax rate. Social mobility upwards for the
median income earner weakens the conßict of interests between the medium- and high-
wage earners, but strengthens the conßict of interests between the two well-oﬀ groups and
the low-wage earners.
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5.1 Introduction of a private insurance alternative
What happens if we get a private alternative in this case? The previous section showed
that the marginal beneÞt of consumption when not employed is higher for a median income
earner with social mobility than without. This aﬀects the conditions for a positive optimal
demand for private insurance. Remember from section 4.1.1 that assumption (54) implied
a non-positive optimal demand for private insurance and no change in the preferred tax
rate for the median income earner. With social mobility, (54) is no longer a suﬃcient
condition. A high-wage earner can beneÞt by buying private insurance and reduce the
amount of social insurance by lowering the tax rate. This is taken into account by the
median income earner if he has a positive probability of ending up as a high-income earner.
Recall that with a private insurance consumption is given by
CiE = (1− t)wi − qQi
when employed and
CN =
p
1− pτ (t) + (1− q)Qi
when not employed. The public and private insurance decision can either be taken si-
multaneous or in two steps. I assume that the private insurance decision is more ßexible
than the public one. That is, I assume that the consumer is able to adapt the private
insurance to his realized income level, but that the tax rate is more rigid and that the
decision regarding the preferred tax rate is taken prior to an eventual increase in income.
This assumption simpliÞes the analysis and seems reasonable.
We Þnd the optimal solution by maximizing (66) with respect to t and Qi. The Þrst
order conditions are
∂vM
∂t
= 0
⇔ −p(1− α)u0(CME )w¯ − pαu0(CHE )wH + (1− p)u0(CN)
p
1− pτ
0(t)w¯ = 0
⇔ (1− α) p
1− p
u0(CME )
u0(CN)
+ α
p
1− p
u0(CHE )
u0(CN)
wH
w¯
=
p
1− pτ
0(t) =
1
PMs
(70)
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and
∂vM
∂Qi
= 0
⇔ −p(1− α)u0(CME )q − pαu0(CHE )q + (1− p)u0(CN)(1− q) = 0
⇔ (1− α) p
1− p
u0(CME )
u0(CN )
+ α
p
1− p
u0(CHE )
u0(CN )
=
1− q
q
=
1
Pp
(71)
The private insurance can be adapted to the realized income. A positive demand for
private insurance is a necessary condition for a viable insurance marked. This demand is
given by (10) for i = H or equivalently
p
1− p
u0(CHE )
u0(CN)
=
1
Pp
This inserted in (70) and (71) gives, from(70)
(1− α) p
1− p
u0(CME )
u0(CN)
=
1
PMs
− α 1
Pp
wH
w¯
=
Pp − αPHs
PMs Pp
MRSN,M = (1− α) Pp
Pp − αPHs
PMs ≡ K(t)PMs (t) ≡ PSMs (t), (72)
where
K(t) ≡ (1− α) Pp
Pp − αPHs
,
and from (71)
(1− α) p
1− p
u0(CME )
u0(CN)
= (1− α) 1
Pp
MRSN,M = Pp (73)
If optimal demand for private insurance is positive with a median income, optimal
consumption is given by (73). If optimal demand for private insurance is zero, the pre-
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ferred tax rate is given by (73). The left-hand side of (73) is the transformation frontier
between consumption when not employed and consumption when employed for the me-
dian income earner, with social mobility partially internalizing the interests of the high
income earners. P SMs (t) is increasing in the degree of social mobility, α, and the wage
diﬀerences, wH/w¯. PSMs is increasing in t in the presence of deadweight costs of taxation,
and a constant without deadweight costs.
Proposition 7 The eﬃciency loss (gain) for the high income earners from increasing the
tax rate is internalized by the median income earner with social mobility, making the cost
of increased social insurance higher (lower).
We see from (72) that for a given t, PSMs > P
M
s if K > 1 i.e.
(1− α) Pp
Pp − αPHs
> 1
(1− α)Pp > Pp − αPHs
−αPp > −αPHs
Pp < P
H
s
From the deÞnition of tH , (PHs (tH) = Pp) it follows that
Pp < P
H
s ⇒ t > tH
Increasing the degree of social insurance by increasing the tax rate above the cost-eﬃcient
tax rate for the high income earners, tH , implies an eﬃciency loss for the high income
earner. A median income earner with social mobility upwards internalizes this extra cost,
thus making the cost of social insurance higher with social mobility than without. For
tax rates lower than tH , the argument goes the other way around, making the costs of
social insurance lower with social mobility than without:
PSMs > P
M
s for t > tH
PSMs < P
M
s for t < tH
We remember from section four that the preferred tax rate for the median income
earner is higher than the preferred tax rate for the high income earner in the precence of
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a private alternative, t∗M > tH . This makes the cost of social insurance at this tax rate
higher with social mobility than without, PSMs (t
∗
M) > P
M
s (t
∗
M). This implies that the
preferred degree of social insurance is lower with social mobility than without.
Private insurance is strictly preferred over social insurance if it is less costly even for
τ 0(t) = 1, (no deadweight costs or t = 0):
P SMs (τ
0(t) = 1) ≥ Pp
(1− α)P SMs (τ 0(t) = 1) = Pp − αPHs (τ 0(t) = 1)
1− p
p
h
(1− α) + αwH
w¯
i
≥ q
1− q
q ≤ (1− p) [(1− α)w¯ + αwH ]
pw¯ + (1− p) [(1− α)w¯ + αwH ] > 1− p (74)
We see that an actuarially fair premium on private insurance no longer is a necessary
condition for the optimal tax rate to be zero. This means that there may exist a price on
private insurance that makes both the median- and high-income earners exclusively prefer
the private alternative and leaves the insurance company with a positive proÞt and/or
covers the Þxed costs, when the median income earners have social mobility upwards.
Proposition 8 The cost eﬃcient tax rate for the median income earner is lower with
social mobility upwards than without
The cost-eﬃcient tax rate for a median income earner, tSM , with social mobility up-
wards is the tax rate that equal the relative prices on the two insurance forms. If (74)
does not hold, the tax rate that equals the two prices is given by:
P SMs (tSM) = Pp
(1− α) Pp
Pp − αPHs (tSM)
PMs (tSM) = Pp
(1− α)PMs (tSM) = Pp − αPHs (tSM)
(1− α)PMs (tSM) + αPHs (tSM) = Pp (75)
Since PMs < P
H
s for a given t, it follows that
tM > tSM > tH (76)
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The tax rate that makes private and social insurance equally costly is lower with social
mobility than without, the diﬀerence being greater the greater the degree of social mobility
and the wage diﬀerences wH/w¯. Private insurance is preferred over social insurance at a
lower tax rate for a median income earner, with social mobility than one without.
The critical value of consumption when not employed (i.e. where more consumption
is equally costly through a social or private insurance) is given by
CSMN =
p
1− p
1
τ 0(tSM)
w¯
The similar critical value of consumption when employed is given by
CSME = (1− tSM)w¯
This critical degree of insurance is lower than without social mobility, since tM > tSM , as
long as τ 00 < 0. However, Result 7 implied that the preferred degree of social insurance
was lower as well. This means that we cannot say whether social mobility increases or
decreases the chances for a positive optimal demand for private insurance.
The eﬀects of social mobility depends on the relationships among the preferred tax
rates without social mobility and whether optimal demand for private insurance is positive
or not. Recall from section 4.1.1, that is that only the high income earners have a positive
optimal demand for private insurance; t∗M was deÞned by:
MRSN,M = P
M
s (t
∗
M),
and that t∗M > t
∗
H . The eﬀects of social mobility then depend on whether the preferred tax
rate for the high income earners is higher or lower than the low- income earners. Recall
the cases from 4.1.1:
 Case 2a): t∗M > t∗H > t∗L
Increasing the tax rate implies an eﬃciency loss for the high income earners. The
cost for the median income earner is higher with social mobility than without,
P SMs > P
M
s . This lowers the demand for social insurance and the preferred tax rate
is lower as a result. Social mobility makes the preferred tax rate for the median
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income earner closer to the preferred tax rate for the high income earner and the
tax rates are
t∗SM > t
∗
H > t
∗
L
Social mobility lowers the preferred tax rate. The reduction is greatest if optimal
demand for private insurance is positive, but it is higher than t∗H in either case. If
σM < 1/2, this does not aﬀect the realized tax rate, and social mobility only matters
to the median income earners. If σM > 1/2, social mobility reduces the realized tax
rate and leads to a welfare gain for all three groups
 Case 2b) t∗M > t∗L > t∗H
As in Case 2a), social mobility increases the cost of social insurance, which means
that the costs of the welfare state exceeds the beneÞts at t∗M . This reduces the
preferred tax rate for the median income earner. The reduction is greater if optimal
demand for private insurance is positive, but the never so large that the preferred
tax rate is lower than t∗H . The eﬀect on the realized tax rate depends on how large
the reduction is. There are two cases
1. t∗SM > t
∗
L
In this case the median voter is still in the L-group, as long as σM < 1/2, and
the realized tax rate is unaﬀected by social mobility. If σM > 1/2, the realized
tax rate is reduced from t∗M to t
∗
SM and there are welfare gains for all three
groups.
2. t∗SM < t
∗
L
If this is the case, social mobility shifts the median voter from the L-group to
the M-group. The realized tax rate is t∗SM . This implies a welfare gain for the
H-group, and a welfare loss for the L-group.
If the situation without social mobility is as in section 4.1.2, that is that both the
high- and median income earners have a positive optimal demand for private insurance,
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the solution is clearer. Then
MRSN,M = Pp
This inserted in (70) gives
(1− α) 1
Pp
+ α
1
Pp
wH
w¯
=
1
PMs (t
∗
SM)
(1− α)PMs (t∗SM) + αPHs (t∗SM) = Pp
, which is identical to (75). Hence t∗SM = tSM . The optimal tax rate is the tax rate that
makes the expected relative price on consumption when not employed oﬀered through the
social insurance system equal to the relative price oﬀered through the private insurance.
This brings the preferred tax rate for the median income earner closer to the preferred
tax rate for the high income earners, but still makes it higher for all α < 1
t∗M > t
∗
SM > t
∗
H
The eﬀect social mobility has under these conditions depends on what the relationships
among the preferred tax rates without social mobility is. Recall that the realized tax rate
could be either one of the three preferred tax rates in section 4.1.2. Which tax rate that
is the median preferred tax rate depends on whether conditions (63) and (64) hold.
 Case 1): condition (63) holds, but not condition (64). This means that t∗L > t∗M > t∗H
without social mobility
In this case, the median voter is in the M-group with and without social mobility.
Social mobility then reduces the realized tax rate, implying a welfare loss for the
L-group and a welfare gain for the H-group.
 Case 2a): condition (63) does not hold, but condition (64) does. This means that
t∗M > t
∗
L > t
∗
H without social mobility
In this case, the eﬀect of social mobility depends on whether t∗SM is higher than t
∗
L
or not.
1. t∗SM > t
∗
L
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Social mobility has no eﬀect on the realized tax rate, as long as σM < 1/2.
2. t∗SM < t
∗
L
Social mobility shifts the political center from the L-group to the M-group and
thereby reduces the realized tax rate, implying a welfare loss for the L-group
and a welfare gain for the H-group.
 Case 2b): neither condition (63) nor (64) holds. This means that t∗M > t∗H > t∗L
without social mobility
If σM < 1/2, social mobility has no eﬀect on the realized tax rate, which still is t∗H .
In this case social mobility weakens the conßicts of interests in the population.
If positive private insurance is optimal for all three groups, as in section 4.1.3, t∗i = ti
for i = L,M,H. Section 4.1.3 showed that t∗L > t
∗
M > t
∗
H . Social mobility then has the
same eﬀect as in Case 1) from section 4.1.2 above.
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6 Conclusion
I look at the political support for the welfare state with and without a private insurance
alternative. Social insurance supplied by the government has redistributive aspects. Pri-
vate insurance has not. An introduction of a optional private insurance alternative may
reduce the conßicts of interests and improve overall eﬃciency in the economy. However
the introduction may reduce the political support for the welfare state. The scope of the
welfare state may be reduced as a consequence and this may be harmful for some groups.
An introduction of a private alternative that reduces the scope of a welfare state through
a loss of legitimacy, creates a conßict between eﬃciency and legitimacy, if the welfare
state has a redistributive aspect.
High-income earners are paying a higher price on insurance through the social system
than the median- and low-income earners. Everybody pays the same price through the
private system. Private insurance thus has a relatively lower price the higher the income.
If private insurance is attractive as a supplement, it is attractive as an alternative as well.
Hence, all groups who prefers to have a private insurance, prefers a lower tax rate after
the introduction of a private supplement. This may reduce the realized tax rate as well,
if there is a majority in favor of the reduction. The preferred mix between private and
public insurance hence implies a lower share of public insurance the higher the income. A
reduction in the level of government spending may lead to a welfare gain for some groups
of the population, but may also lead to a welfare loss for other groups. If there are some
groups that experience a loss, the introduction of private insurance does not lead to a
Pareto-improvement. There is a social trade-oﬀ. The welfare eﬀect on the society as a
whole depends on how high we value equality and individual freedom.
A way to counteract this eﬀect is to make the welfare policies more universalistic and
thereby making the political support for the welfare state stronger, as seen in Casamatta
et al. (1998), (1999), Moene and Wallerstein (1999) and (2001). Universalistic welfare
policies are often criticized for being ineﬃcient. Designing welfare policies in an ineﬃcient
manner to secure the political support for the welfare state then clearly illustrate the
conßict between eﬃciency and legitimacy.
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